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Abstract— This paper is focused on the teaching of 
engineering ethics (EE). Through a focus on safety and  the lens 
of  what sociologists call the agency/ structure  relationship it 
examimes various approaches to this teaching. Drawing on 
Critical Realism it argues there are deficiencies in both the 
dominant approach and a number of proposed alternatives as 
they suffer from various forms of conflationism . By drawing on 
Critical Realism (CR) a more robust agenda for teaching 
engineering ethics can be developed. It is argued that CR offers a 
basis for understanding the range of factors which lead to 
accidents and disasters. It allows for a fuller consideration of 
agency/structure relations and the importance of changing the 
contexts in which engineers work in order to allow them to hold 
paramount the health, safety and welfare of the public. 
Keywords—engineering  ethics; safety; strcture/agency 
realtions; critical realism. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is about the teaching of engineering ethics 
(EE). Through a focus on safety and  the lens of  what 
sociologists call the agency/ structure (individual/society) 
relationship it examimes various approaches to this teaching. 
Drawing on Critical Realism [1] it argues there are 
deficiencies in both the dominant approach and a number of 
proposed alternatives as they suffer from, what Archer has 
called, various forms of conflationism [1]. It will also be 
argued that by drawing on Critical Realism (CR) a more 
robust agenda for teaching engineering ethics can be 
developed. The paper proceeds as follows. First the accident at 
BP Texas City in 2005 is discussed. It is shown that rather 
than being the fault of individuals it resulted from problematic 
features of BPs corporate culture and strategy. It is shown that 
the accident shares common features with other accidents as 
identified in the literature. The question is then posed as to 
how engineering students should be taught about such 
accidents and what should be the focus of such teaching.  It is 
argued that the dominant approach, with its emphasis on the 
agency of individual engineers, is deficient in that it cannot 
adequately address the range of issue identified. It is also 
argued that some proposed alternatives do not address these 
inadequacies as they focus on structure alone. Finally it is 
argued that CR offers a basis for understanding the range of 
factors which lead to accidents and disasters. It allows for a 
fuller consideration of agency/structure relations and the 
importance of changing the contexts in which engineers work 
in order to allow them to hold paramount the health, safety 
and welfare of the public. 
II. BP TEXAS CITY 
On March 23, 2005 fifteen workers were killed and 180 
injured in a series of explosions and fires during the start-up of 
an isomerisation (ISOM) unit at the third largest refinery in 
US owned by BP1.  All the dead were contract workers. BP 
blamed the blast on “a series of failures” by staff: “Had the 
individuals who were operating the facilities and running the 
facilities followed the written instructions, the explosion 
would not have happened.”  Its investigations blamed the 
incident on a series of “surprising and deeply disturbing” 
mistakes by plant operators and supervisors. BP said company 
investigators “didn’t find evidence of budgetary decisions 
which were an immediate cause or critical factor in this 
terrible tragedy.” 
The view of the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) was 
somewhat different. Its preliminary report found that high-
level decisions to defer overhauls, cut staff, and rein in costs 
contributed to the accident.  BP had cut fixed costs by about 
25% from 1998 to 2004. These cuts “adversely impacted 
maintenance expenditures and infrastructure at the refinery.”  
The CSB chairperson said that BP displayed “all the 
symptoms of a failed safety culture”: poor maintenance; 
inadequate staff training; outdated procedures; malfunctioning 
equipment; overworked and over-stretched staff without 
adequate supervision.  The final CSB report found that the 
disaster “was caused by organizational and safety deficiencies 
at all levels of the BP Corporation” including inadequate 
corporate response to safety problems, ignoring regulations 
and a focus on production over safety. BP’s attribution of the 
incident to worker error was put in context by the final report 
that said these workers had each worked almost 40 
consecutive shifts. Such intense working periods are 
characteristic of turnaround and maintenance when there is a 
major rush to get capital-intensive plants back into operation.  
The use of contract workers for maintenance operations 
increased the risk of an accident. 
An additional problem was that for management “ bad 
news was not encouraged, incidents were often ineffectively 
investigated and appropriate corrective action not taken.”  In 
late 2004 consultants were commissioned to survey refinery 
                                                          
1 The information on this accident is taken mainly from [2] but see also 
[3]. 
staff on safety. Workers said they had stopped reporting 
injuries and incidents, due to pressure from management. 
 A final issue was that the plant was ineffectively 
regulated. The blowdown drum and safety relief valve at the 
centre of the incident were undersized: federal regulations 
required a study of the relief system, but BP was unable to 
produce documents showing this study had actually been 
performed: “By 2005 the required relief valve study was 13 
years overdue”.  The plant had an average of one fire a week 
in the ten years leading up to the accident. The CSB was 
critical of the regulatory authorities for its minimal regulation 
of a large number of hazardous plants. Further, BP had 
lobbied against new rules which would have forced it to 
upgrade the ISOM unit. Mac Sheoin [2] argues that the 
accidents and others like it stem “from common technical, 
organizational, and managerial problems, many of which are 
directly related to economic decisions”. 
 What is of significance from the above is the contrast 
between BPs explanation focusing on the actions of 
individuals and the CSB approach which highlights economic, 
organisational and social factors which contributed to the 
explosion.  Its report accords with research on accidents which 
argues that “attempts to find an identifiable culprit (should) 
not obscure the more subtle causes of failure which are 
typically complex, multiple and rooted in the social and 
organisational properties of the overall sociotechnical system 
associated with hazardous technology” [4]. These causes recur 
in disparate engineering sectors [5]. 
The factors identified by the CSB report are not 
uncommon in other accidents. Dien et al. [6] identify recurrent 
features of  “organisational accidents”. In doing so they argue 
that “the scientific community involved in the field of accident 
study agrees on the fact that if any event (accident, incident or 
crisis) is generated by direct and immediate causes (“human 
errors” among others), it has been induced and favoured by 
underlying local causes or conditions (specific technical and 
ergonomic conditions, local modes of personnel management, 
environmental characteristics, etc.) and more global 
organisational conditions which may be at the origin of the 
local conditions or have an impact on the direct or immediate 
causes (e.g. weak safety culture, primacy of production 
pressure, failure or lack of communication between business 
entities, technocratic reorganisation, a deteriorating social 
climate, etc.).” 
Accidents have an historical background and an 
unfavourable organisational context in as much as a number of 
decisions and unfavourable circumstances progressively 
generate a pre-accident situation long before the triggering of 
the accident itself. Accidents can be seen to have an 
incubation period when multiple predisposing factors 
accumulate. A trigger event then provokes the onset of the 
accident [4]. The recurrent factors identified by Dien et al. are: 
1. Weakness of the organisational safety culture; 2. Complex 
and inappropriate organisation; 3. Limits of operational 
feedback; 4. Failure of the control organisations; and 5. 
Production pressures. 
Taking a more radical and integrated approach Tombs 
[6,7] offers what he calls a “political economy of corporate 
killing.” In explaining “safety crimes” he argues for an 
approach based on political economy which places their 
production within “prevailing systems of economic, social and 
political organisation, dominant value systems and beliefs, and 
the differential distribution of power. Grasping the complexity 
of safety crimes means addressing a series of inter-related 
factors, not least dynamically (that is, historically) and beyond 
the level of the nation state”. He argues that there is a need to 
consider a range of factors ranging from the individual 
through to the structural operating at four analytically distinct 
levels. Individuals need to be placed in the structures in which 
they operate and this means taking account of their immediate 
work group, workplace, company and the wider environment 
in which the company operates. This leads to a focus on the 
relationship between profit and safety, management and 
workers (including the capacity of the latter to organise and 
challenge the former and the extent to which management 
heed warnings from below), the role of the state in regulating 
safety and supporting a “voice” for workers and state business 
relations: corporations operate within “particular kinds of 
social order with certain legal bases guarantees and powers”.  
In this context the advent of neo-liberal regimes with 
commitments to deregulation and the valorisation of risk has 
had a detrimental effect on workplace safety2. What is 
significant about this approach is that it seeks to integrate 
mechanisms operating at different levels into explanations of 
management and worker interactions and their effects on 
safety. It focuses on the  distribution of power and “exposes as 
socially specific what is taken for granted, revealing how what 
is, was not always so, and need not necessarily be, with 
existent states of affairs only comprehensible in the context of 
macro-level social processes, on both national and 
international levels.” [7]. 
III. ENGINEERING ETHICS 
The above raises a challenge for those seeking to teach EE 
and who want to empower engineers to hold paramount the 
safety, health and welfare of the public. The dominant 
approach [10,11,12,13] to EE uses case studies to focus on the 
resolution of ethical dilemmas by individual engineers. These 
often involve clashes between engineers and managers and 
focus on the capacity of engineers to resist managerial 
pressures and/or engage in whistleblowing.  The approach 
draws on moral philosophy and codes of ethics, “standards of 
responsibility” [15], as the basis of ethical decision making.  
EE should help “engineers to take their professional 
responsibilities to heart” [14].  It assumes that not only can 
ethical problems be solved at the level of the individual but 
that engineers can act on their solutions.  As a result, those 
using this approach tend to focus on individual failings as the 
key impediments to responsible action [see 15].   
In explaining the Challenger Disaster Davis focuses on  
                                                          
2 See [9] for a discussion of engineering and neo-liberalism 
“microscopic vision” and that fact the Lund (an engineer) 
stopped thinking like an engineer and more like a manager: 
“Lund had a professional duty to act like an engineer…For an 
engineer public safety is the paramount consideration. The 
engineers could not say the launch would be safe, so, Lund 
should have  delayed the launch. Seven people died, in part at 
least because Lund did not do what, as an engineer, he was 
supposed to do” [16]. This explanation seems to ignore the 
analysis presented above about the importance of an 
incubation period generating a pre-accident situation and the 
range of contextual factors that contribute to this and focuses 
solely on the individual engineer: “A solid grounding in moral 
philosophy, a personal moral code, and a commitment to 
professional responsibility are assumed to inoculate us from 
the weakness of will” [17].  By ignoring the structural context 
in which engineering takes place this approach leads to 
moralism as unrealistic expectations are placed on engineers. 
One particular problem is what is referred to as the “problem 
of many hands” in that engineers are just one of many actors 
involved in complex organisational and technical processes. 
Further, the freedom of engineers is restricted in that they 
typically work in “hierarchical organisations and have little 
room to follow their own choices” [17]. This refers to what is 
known as the captivity of engineering to corporate and 
managerial agendas [18].  
A related problem with this approach is its commitment to 
value neutrality. While engineers are to practice engineering 
ethically they are not to commit to any particular set of values. 
Engineers are to strive for “creative middle ground” [15] 
solutions and EE teachers are to avoid preaching [19].  There 
would seem to be an assumption that not only are creative 
middle ground solutions desirable but also that they are 
attainable (in that the needs of all parties can be met) and 
implementable without addressing the wider context in which 
problems arise.. The contexts that underlies cases is not called 
into question. Thus this approach does not lead to the 
questioning of the wider purpose of engineering or the role of 
engineers in reproducing power relations and patterns of 
privilege in society. There is a crucial link between the 
ontological assumption that EE teaching should focus 
narrowly on the practice of individual engineers and the 
political assumption that ethical dilemmas can be resolved at 
this level without changing the context in which engineers 
work. This is why some have called for a focus on institutional 
ethics rather than individual ethics. Underlying this work is 
the recognition that “If the engineers claim for safety have to 
survive in a context dominated by competition for money and 
power, regulation with an ethical content may be the engineers 
life jacket” [20, see also 21]. This is part of a wider call for 
alternative approaches which focus on the realities of 
engineering practice, the broad goals of engineering, policy 
issues and institutional arrangements which affect the practice 
of engineering [22]. 
IV. PROFESSIONAL AND ORGANISATIONAL CULTURES 
From the perspective of social ontology and the 
agency/structure relationship the traditional approach can be 
seen to be overly focused on the agency of engineers. As 
already suggested a variety of alternative approaches have 
been proposed. Some [23] meet the requirement, as argued for 
by Herkert [24], to integrate marco issues into EE by focusing 
on the goals of the profession.  Drawing from the philosophy 
of technology, Son [13] has argued that a shift to a macro 
focus, 
should lead to a questioning of the goals of engineering or 
current forms of technological development. He says that 
‘‘…engineers will be obliged to reflect on what kind of 
society is desirable, to produce sound arguments for their 
ideas, and to conduct and justify their engineering 
practices accordingly”. This may lead engineers to 
question their involvement in particular engineering 
projects and the pace and trajectory of technological 
development. While it can be agreed that there is a need to 
question current paths of technological development and 
the goals and aspirations of engineers this needs to be  
accompanied by proposals and strategies for change. 
Otherwise we will end up with a purely aspirational ethics 
[23] which aspires to the ‘Good Society’ but offers no map 
as to how to get there because it does not address the 
captive nature of the profession and the tendency of 
capitalism to commodify all social relations so that they 
become purely instrumental [25]. Raising the level of 
analysis to address macro issues and the broader goals of 
engineering is not enough unless we address the capacity 
of engineers to practice engineering in a way that 
promotes safety (and sustainability and social justice). 
This means changing the structural context in which they 
work.  Son argues that this task may be beyond applied 
ethics as a whole “because it deals with ethical issues 
within existing systems, but does not necessarily try to 
change the system itself” [13].  
A shift in emphasis would require a more sociological 
focus on how the practices of engineers impact on and are 
impacted by the social system. But this is not unproblematic. 
Davis [26] argues that sociological approaches to EE tend to 
make decisions seem inevitable as events are seen as linked by 
social forces rather than by individual decisions.  And there is 
validity to this critique as some forms of sociological 
explanation treat humans as oversocialised “cultural dopes” 
who merely manifest the demands of their society. If actions 
are determined at this level then all ethical issues are diluted as 
human resistance and intervention become futile. 
There is a tendency to such an approach in the much 
praised account of the Challenger Disaster by Vaughan [27]. 
Her approach is seen by some to offer the basis for a clear 
alternative to the focus on dilemmas facing engineers by 
focusing on the practice of engineers and the organisational 
and cultural context of that practice [17]. In explaining the 
disaster she emphasises institutional logics and the manner in 
which patterns of behaviour developed and became 
institutionalised within the organisations supporting the 
Shuttle programme.  Vaughan discusses how risk came to be 
redefined, leading to the “normalisation of deviance” and a 
number of launches with a flawed design.  She correctly 
highlights the wider economic and political environment in 
which NASA operated and the way it contributed to the 
normalisation of deviance.  Changes in NASA’s budgetary 
environment meant that “schedule, budget, following rules and 
procedures, and allegiance to hierarchy displaced safety and 
deference to the expertise of working engineers” [27]. Thus 
she not only focuses on the organisation and work groups but 
also the relationship between the culture of the workgroup and 
the wider economic and political environment. She is sceptical 
about the possibilities for organisational reform which does 
not take account of this wider environment.  
While being a useful corrective to the focus on individual 
engineers this seems to argue for too neat a fit between the 
wider culture, the organisational culture and the behaviour of 
individuals. Drawing on particular theoretical approaches, new 
institutionalism and Bourdieu’s concept of habitus [28], she 
tends to emphasis the determining role of social structures at 
the expense of human agency. She relies on new 
institutionalism to argue that the institutional context gave rise 
to a culture of production that led to a defective decision 
making process [29]. Her use of this approach leads to an 
emphasis on the integrating role of the organisational culture: 
the stress is on the unreflective and routine. The taken-for 
granted and unreflective nature of action  is reinforced by her 
use of habitus to demonstrate how the institutional forces in 
the organisational environment become embodied in the 
actions of the engineers. Proponents of new institutionalism 
have seen it as a key concept for linking macro social forces to 
behaviour to explain how “actors chronically reproduce and 
acquiesce to social structures that are not in their interest” 
[30]. This would seem to leave little room for human 
reflection and intentionality and little possibility for change.  
It is no surprise then that Freeland [31] claims that 
Vaughan veers too far towards an “oversocialised” conception 
of action “in which actors passively reproduce learned cultural 
scripts”. A key criticism of her account is in focusing on the 
institutional culture she neglects the issue of power: “she 
replaces the study of conflict with a notion of totalising and 
unconscious institutional forces” [29, see also 33]. In fact the 
launch decision, which led to the disaster, took place under 
unprecedented cold conditions outside parameters that had not 
been previously investigated. Thus it was not normal. If 
universal macro forces were dominant disagreement could not 
have arisen. The launch was opposed by a group of engineers 
who knew it was outside normal parameters, rather than being 
embedded in an unquestioned culture [32]. In effect she is 
offering a particular kind of sociological explanation, with the 
emphasis on the organisational culture, which does not take 
adequate account of the capacity of people to challenge 
dominant cultural scripts and the social relations which 
provide differential access to power and resources. 
It is worth noting at this point that both the traditional 
approach and that of Vaughan are both politically 
problematical in that in focusing, on the one hand, on 
decontextualised individuals and, on the other, the all-
encompassing power of institutional logics, they either do not 
see the need for institutional change or render engineers 
powerless in bringing about change. Either there is no need for 
change or no chance of bringing it about. In attempting to 
build on Vaughan’s approach, and in focusing on 
organisational culture, Lynch and Kline do not overcome this 
problem.  They want to assert the possibility for the 
imaginative prevention of the “normalisation of deviance” at 
the workplace. They aim  “to explore how engineers can learn 
to identify features of their everyday practice that potentially 
contributes to ethically problematic outcomes before clear-cut 
ethical dilemmas emerge”. Their approach to accident 
prevention remains focused on the moral responsibility of 
engineers and less on the changing the institutional 
environment in which they work [10]. This is despite Vaughan 
paying considerable attention to the wider economic and 
political environment in which NASA operated and the way it 
reinforced the normalisation of deviance. 
 Lynch and Kline’s focus is on the organisational culture 
and they fail to adequately specify how engineers who become 
aware of the normalisation of deviance are to change 
organisational practice. They dismiss those who consider the 
role that engineering professional bodies, codes of ethics, 
trade unions, lawyers and regulatory agencies can play in 
bolstering responses to safety issues.  In considering Lynch 
and Kline’s approach Swierstra and Jelsma [14], argue that in 
“modern technology projects” the necessary conditions for 
individual moral agency are lacking and that the picture 
painted by Lynch and Kline is far too rosy. They call for a 
sociologically informed way of studying engineering practice, 
endorse the call for “an institutional ethics”  and a focus on the 
relationship between individual moral agency on the one hand 
and the individual’s enabling and constraining environment on 
the other.  
V. CRITICAL REALISM (CR) 
Vaughan offers one way of understanding this relationship 
with the emphasis of the determining and constraining effect 
of the institutional environment.  Recognising the deficiencies 
of such an approach CR seeks to provide an account of the 
agency structure relationship which takes account of a 
properly argued view of both and the relationship between 
them [34].  CR argues for the primacy of ontology and that 
“the social ontology endorsed … conceptualises social reality 
in certain terms, thus identifying what there is to be 
explained”[1]. Thus what society is held to be, including how 
we understand the relationship between structure and action, 
affects what constitutes “explanatory purchase on substantive 
social problems”. 
In seeking to explain social phenomena CR offers a 
distinctive approach [36]. Two issues are important for the 
purposes of this paper. Firstly, CR offers a depth ontology: a 
notion of a stratified reality which includes a distinction 
between the domain of the real (generative mechanisms), the 
actual (events) and the empirical (experiences). Structures of 
objects at the level of the real generate mechanisms that 
facilitate events.  CR focuses on the identification of these 
mechanisms as causal factors explaining social phenomena. 
This is potentially emancipatory in that it forces us to consider 
“that certain states of affairs cannot be ameliorated within 
existing structures”. [37]. They must be changed. 
Secondly, structures are described as generative 
mechanisms, because when their powers are realised they 
work to make things happen. Their activation is dependent on 
human agents. CR is committed to an explanatory model “in 
which the interplay between pre-existent structures, possessing 
causal powers…and people possessing causal powers…of 
their own results in contingent yet explicable outcomes” [36]. 
Thus any investigation can only take place at the intersection 
of agential and structural objects. Archer [1] argues that social 
theory has proposed unsatisfactory ways to understand this 
relationship and provides a framework for understanding 
different approaches by focusing on what she calls varieties of 
conflationism. On the one hand there is downward conflation 
which emphasis the determining effect of social structures and 
allows very little role for intentional human activity in 
explaining social forms. On the other hand there is upward 
conflation which places undue emphasis on the creative and 
intentional  dimension of human activity and downplays the 
way human beings are “constrained by the way society is 
constructed” [34]. She identifies a third kind of central 
conflationism which see agency and structure as “mutually 
constitutive” and fundamentally inseparable. Structures are 
instantiated in social practices and are not seen as constituting 
externalised entities that constrain agency in various ways. 
Thus structure is collapsed into agency and their properties 
cannot be examined separately.  
What CR seeks to do is to avoid these positions and to take 
account of a properly argued view of both and the relationship 
between them. CR is committed to analytical dualism in that 
structure and agency are seen as objects of a distinct type 
possessing different properties and powers.  For the latter 
these include self-consciousness, reflexivity, intentionality, 
cognition and emotionality. The key properties of social 
structures are anteriority (they are pre-existing features of the 
world we are born into) and that they are relatively enduring.  
Among the powers possessed by social structures are those of 
enablement and constraint. 
One consequence of this is that actors are capable of 
reflection and can formulate commitments and develop 
normative projects as a consequence of their deliberations 
upon their social situation. But we do not do this in 
circumstances of our own choosing: “People choose what they 
do, but they make their choices from a structurally and 
culturally determined range of options – which they do not 
choose” [36].  As seen above structures predates agency. 
While structure are dependent on activity those actions that 
produce a given structure may be those of a past generation. 
Therefore the relationship between agency and structure has to 
be examined over time. Once these differential temporalities 
of structure and agency are taken into account the close bond 
between the two, as argued for by central conflationists, is 
loosened and it becomes necessary to differentiate the two and 
examine their interplay. In order to do so, Archer has proposed 
her morphogenetic model of explanation which works on the 
basis of a three part cycle of analysis: 
a) Structural conditioning: pre-existence structures as 
generative mechanisms that condition but do not determine; 
b) Social interaction: their interplay with other objects 
including agents possessing causal powers leading to 
c) Structural elaboration or modification: non-predictable 
but explicable outcomes arising from the interactions between 
the above. 
The model allows us to focus on the interplay between 
structure and agency and the possibility of change arising from 
social interactions. This arises because agents can reflect on 
their situation and formulate projects for change and structures 
can provide them with the power to carry them through. Thus 
transformation is dependent both on a commitment to change 
and a supportive social context.  
VI. CR AND ETHICS EDUCATION 
From the perspective of EE education this approach would 
seem to have a number of advantages. It avoids the 
conflationism evidenced in the approaches to EE outlined 
above. The traditional approach, and also that of Lynch and 
Kline, are forms of upward conflationism as they focus on the 
agency of engineers while the analysis of Vaughan suffers 
from downward conflationism in emphasising the determining 
effects of the institutional culture.  
It can be noted also that while some have called for a 
greater integration of Science and Technology Studies (STS) 
into the study of EE [38] it has been argued that approaches to 
understanding technology and organisations associated with 
STS are characterised by a flat ontology associated with 
central conflationism and pay inadequate attention to the need 
to distinguish between different levels or forms of analysis. 
They tend to focus on the domain of the empirical and the 
processal character of social reality [39,40,41]. Law [42] 
claims that “this position is implied in the ANT (Actor 
Network Theory) refusal to use contextual arguments about 
‘social shaping’ to explain the unfolding of socio-technical 
networks. ANT authors tend to argue that social, political, 
economic contexts are mobilised and enacted together with 
technical or scientific ‘content’. The former do not shape the 
latter”.  Applying this to engineering practice he suggests we 
should seek to improve “the character of that practice…rather 
than discovering the operation of undermining external 
forces”.  But if we cannot analytically distinguish between the 
context and content or practice then it is impossible to 
understand how the social world shapes that practice and 
enables or constrains the actions of engineers. The ontological 
status and explanatory power of structure is lost [41].   
CR encourages us to examine ethical issues in a manner 
which focus underlying generative mechanisms, the 
interactions between them and their impacts on engineering 
practice over time.  It “forces us to look at deeper structural 
things that might be the cause of events” [35] like the 
underlying organisational, economic and political factors 
identified in the discussion of accidents above. But it also 
encourages us to consider the capacity of engineers (as social 
agents) to influence organisational practices.  In this context a 
key issue is the extent to which dominant views are 
contestable [32] and the manner in which engineers are 
enabled to contest dominant views and promote change. Thus 
the promotion of an institutional ethics is useful, but does not 
resolve all issues in that regulation has to be fought for and 
implemented [20]. Therefore CR provides a theoretical basis 
for placing second order responsibilities on engineers to strive 
for the creation of supportive social environments which 
enable their social responsibility [10]. Arising from this we are 
required to examine the interventions of engineers in the 
public policy domain and  how  they contribute to the 
structural conditioning of engineering practice and whether 
the resulting laws, regulation and practices contribute to 
structural elaboration or modification. By focusing on the 
interaction of agential and structural objects CR avoids the 
moralism of the traditional approach and the determinism of 
those who argue for the overarching influence of 
organisational culture in explaining accidents and disasters.By 
attempting to identify the structural and material preconditions 
for successful interventions in the world a CR approach can 
put us in a better position to identify impediments to change at 
the level of the real and address underlying causes of 
phenomena such as accidents. One outcome of this may be a 
more effective approach to accident prevention. 
VII. - CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has argued that there are deficiencies in the 
dominant approach to engineering ethics and some proposed 
alternatives. A  more adequate approach can draw on CR to 
shift the emphasis from the teaching of moral reasoning and a 
narrow focus on values and attitudes to a concern with the 
integration into engineering programmes of the social and 
institutional context of engineers work and the role of 
engineers in promoting policy changes and social practices 
that change these social contexts and enable social 
responsibility [see 43]. This should force us to ask our 
students to consider what alternative models of engineering 
practice are available other than those located within profit 
driven and hierarchically organised corporations [7, 22]. This 
would require a focus on the use of  history, politics, 
organisation and social theory in engineering programmes and 
may move us far from teaching ethics as traditionally 
understood and to a greater focus on social policy. This may 
raise the question as to whether all those apparently engaged 
in teaching engineering ethics are actually involved in the 
same enterprise as the emphasis shifts from  moral decision 
making to concerns about the social context in which 
engineering takes place [44]. But surely this is a less 
interesting question than one that focuses on what is actually 
required in engineering education to enable future engineers to  
understand  the full range of issues they will be required to 
address in order hold paramount the health, safety and welfare 
of the public. 
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